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CVE-2026-91973 · GHSA-m469-88xx-8rx2

Vikunja: CalDAV and feeds BasicAuth endpoints have no rate limit, bypassing the anti-brute-force floor on account passwords

Risk score
48/100
CVSS
Medium
Exploit chance (30 days)
0.7%
Published
9 Oct 2026

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What to know

What it is
The /dav, /.well-known, and /feeds groups are registered on the root Echo instance with only BasicAuth and no rate limiter. CalDAV BasicAuth accepts the plain account password, so password guessing over /dav is unbounded and never returns 429, while /api/v1/login is throttled from the tenth attempt. The only anti-brut…
Affected
code.vikunja.io/api (go) <= 2.5.0
Fix
Upgrade code.vikunja.io/api to 2.6.0 or later.
Exploitation
No known exploitation

Story map

Story map: code.vikunja.io/apiTHE FLAWSTHE FIXCVE-2026-91973Vikunja: CalDAV and feedsBasicAuth endpoints have norate limit, bypassing the…EPSS 1%CVE-2026-91972Vikunja: Every /api/v2pre-auth endpoint isunthrottled on a stock install…CVSS 8.7 · EPSS 1%CVE-2026-68581Vikunja: Link-share principalID collision allowscross-account API token…CVSS 8.1 · EPSS 0%CVE-2026-62376Vikunja: Plaintext storage ofpassword-reset/email-confirmtokens in database enables…CVSS 8.1 · EPSS 0%Upgrade code.vikunja.io/api2.4.0or later on your release lineWho is exposedcode.vikunja.io/api (go) <= 2.5.0AMBER · PATCH THIS WEEKcode.vikunja.io/apiregisterAPIRoutesV2 neverapplies the unconditionalpre-auth rate-limit floor(unauthRateLimit()) to the v2public routes — it passes thatlimiter only to /api/v2/ws — andotherwise relies on…Where it standsPublic proof of conceptCONNECTS TOSame weaknessCWE-307 (CWE-307)28 other warnings in 30 days →
Story map: the flaws, the fix, how it unfolded and what it connects to. Boxes link to the record or article.

At a glance

code.vikunja.io/api: Amber, patch this week. registerAPIRoutesV2 never applies the unconditional pre-auth rate-limit floor (unauthRateLimit()) to the v2 public routes — it passes that limiter only to /api/v2/ws — and otherwise relies on setupRateLimit, which registers nothing when ratelimit.enabled is false (the default). So on a stock install every v2 pre-auth …

The flaws

  • CVE-2026-91973: Vikunja: CalDAV and feeds BasicAuth endpoints have no rate limit, bypassing the anti-brute-force floor on account passwords (EPSS 1%)
  • CVE-2026-91972: Vikunja: Every /api/v2 pre-auth endpoint is unthrottled on a stock install while its /api/v1 twin is rate limited (CVSS 8.7 · EPSS 1%)
  • CVE-2026-68581: Vikunja: Link-share principal ID collision allows cross-account API token issuance and management (CVSS 8.1 · EPSS 0%)
  • CVE-2026-62376: Vikunja: Plaintext storage of password-reset/email-confirm tokens in database enables account takeover on DB read access (CVSS 8.1 · EPSS 0%)

The fix

Upgrade code.vikunja.io/api: 2.4.0 or later on your release line

Who is exposed: code.vikunja.io/api (go) <= 2.5.0

Where it stands

  • Public proof of concept

Connects to

Why it is Yellow

  • Rated medium by the publisher (no CVSS yet)
  • On your watchlist: Go

Affected packages

PackageEcosystemVulnerableFixed in
code.vikunja.io/apigo<= 2.5.02.6.0

References

Original description

### Summary The `/dav`, `/.well-known`, and `/feeds` groups are registered on the root Echo instance with only BasicAuth and no rate limiter. CalDAV BasicAuth accepts the plain account password, so password guessing over `/dav` is unbounded and never returns 429, while `/api/v1/login` is throttled from the tenth attempt. The only anti-brute-force control on the instance is therefore bypassable. ### Details `pkg/routes/routes.go` (~lines 238-249) registers `/.well-known`, `/dav`, and `/feeds` with `middleware.BasicAuth(...)` and nothing else; `registerCalDavRoutes` adds no limiter. `pkg/routes/caldav/auth.go` (~lines 88-93) falls through to `user.CheckUserCredentials` with the plain account password when no CalDAV token matches. In contrast, `/register`, `/login`, etc. are wrapped by `unauthRateLimit()` — an unconditional 10/min/IP pre-auth floor that ignores `ratelimit.enabled` (default false). TOTP-enabled accounts and bot users are correctly refused, so this targets password-only accounts. ### PoC (verified at runtime against v2.5.0) ``` POST /api/v1/login x25 wrong passwords -> 429 from attempt 2 (throttled) PROPFIND /dav/principals/{user}/ x60 wrong passwords -> 401 x60, 429 x0 GET /feeds/notifications.atom x30 wrong passwords -> 401 x30, 429 x0 PROPFIND /dav/... with correct password -> 207 (proves the 401s are real auth failures) ``` ### Impact The anti-brute-force floor guarding `/login` is entirely absent on `/dav`, `/feeds`, and `/.well-known`, giving an unbounded credential-guessing surface against account passwords. (bcrypt caps throughput to a few guesses/second, but nothing caps the number of attempts.) Reported as an authentication-control bypass, not a DoS. ### Fix Apply the unconditional pre-auth rate-limit floor to the `/dav`, `/.well-known`, and `/feeds` groups.

Last activity 9 Oct 2026. Patch Forecast updates every hour.