better-auth: OAuth Proxy lets an attacker sign in as another user

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Why it is Yellow

• CVSS 7.4 high
• Remotely exploitable without logging in
• On your watchlist: npm

Affected packages

References

• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r4xp-prcw-77qf
• https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/security/advisories/GHSA-r4xp-prcw-77qf
• https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/pull/11494
• https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/commit/ac54bfd67821a7607533af2059858b12bc54e26a
• https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/releases/tag/v1.7.7
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r4xp-prcw-77qf

Original description

## Am I affected? You may be affected if you use `better-auth` from 1.5.0-beta.12 through versions before 1.7.7 with the OAuth Proxy plugin. You are affected only if **all** of these are also true: - On a participating environment, the OAuth Proxy plugin has no dedicated `secret`, or its `secret` equals that environment's global Better Auth secret. - Sign-in state is stored in a cookie (`account.storeStateStrategy: "cookie"`). With a database or secondary storage, this is only the case if you chose it explicitly. - Implicit account linking is on (the default). You are not affected by this path if every participating environment uses a proxy `secret` distinct from its global Better Auth secret, if sign-in state is stored in the database, or if you use a version before 1.5.0-beta.12. ## Summary The OAuth Proxy plugin trusts any user profile it can decrypt. In the affected setup, Better Auth encrypts sign-in state, including data the caller chose, with the same secret and hands it to anyone who starts a social sign-in. An attacker can use this to get a fake profile for another user's email address that the proxy accepts as real. ## Impact An attacker without an account who knows a user's verified email address can sign in as that user, with that user's permissions. They can read private data, change the account, and link a provider account of their choice to it. They need no provider sign-in and no action from the victim. No availability impact is established, and a reported open redirect was not confirmed. ## Patches The fix is merged for the planned `better-auth` 1.7.7 release. That package is not available yet. Upgrade all nodes handling the same cookie-backed OAuth or SAML state flow and all OAuth Proxy participants together, including the production coordinator and preview or development deployments. Keep installed Better Auth packages released alongside `better-auth` on the same release version. Restart pending sign-in and account-linking flows; pre-upgrade state cookies and proxy payloads are rejected. Public options and API signatures are unchanged. ## Workarounds Until you upgrade to the fixed release, apply one of these: - Set one strong OAuth Proxy `secret` across every environment that takes part in the proxy flow, and keep it different from each environment's global Better Auth secret. - Set `account.storeStateStrategy: "database"`. This is already the default when a database or secondary storage is configured. If Magic Link is also enabled, switching can expose a separate cross-purpose verification-record path in affected releases. Ensure the two flows resolve to distinct stored identifiers; with built-in options, use Magic Link `storeToken: "hashed"` with global `verification.storeIdentifier` unset or `"plain"`, or disable Magic Link or both built-in social and Generic OAuth sign-in. - Remove the OAuth Proxy plugin if you do not need it. Setting `account.accountLinking.disableImplicitLinking: true` stops this path from taking over an existing account. It does not fix the underlying flaw: the callback can still accept attacker-made data as a provider identity. Apply one of the steps above as well.