In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tipc: reject invalid and…

Why it is Amber

• CVSS 7.5 high
• Remotely exploitable without logging in
• On your watchlist: linux kernel

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/12cc3a1eac5a2a06b67a7b85f0f48ff241a94d1b
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/478fb08d0c2a53002a721d22b8d6681ec971d90f
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/507a27435b2bb1f22e3a3674f6a6553eb815021b
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/80a9ccfc24d3776ef6753a57315e726475fac7d7
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/99cc2a62e07a44a22254d7beca9ef1f8ad886d0d
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9b94a90651e1fa573c6ac6a5a6b269d5874df2c0
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b0e517961f09b9f60d338d1ea4e17aacdbf206f0
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/edc6593c442278fceff0120e8cc58bc592168c35

Original description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tipc: reject invalid and unexpected GRP_ACK_MSG to prevent bc_ackers underflow Commit 48a5fe38772b ("tipc: fix bc_ackers underflow on duplicate GRP_ACK_MSG") rejected duplicate/stale ACKs in tipc_group_proto_rcv() by returning early when less_eq(acked, m->bc_acked). However, that check remains incomplete in two ways: 1. When grp->bc_ackers is zero (e.g. on a quiet group, when replicast ACKs were not requested, or after all expected members have already acknowledged), an unexpected GRP_ACK_MSG with acked > m->bc_acked passes less_eq() and unconditionally decrements grp->bc_ackers. Because bc_ackers is a u16, this wraps to 65535, causing tipc_group_bc_cong() to permanently report congestion and blocking all future group broadcasts on the socket. 2. During an active broadcast round (grp->bc_ackers > 0), the sender transmits packet S and advances grp->bc_snd_nxt to S + 1. Receivers increment their expected counter to S + 1 upon consuming packet S, so the only valid ACK value for the current round is strictly acked == grp->bc_snd_nxt. However, tipc_group_update_bc_members() initializes each member's m->bc_acked to prev = grp->bc_snd_nxt - 1 (S - 1 before increment). This leaves a 2-sequence gap (S - 1 to S + 1) in sequence space. An incoming ACK is therefore neither rejected as duplicate nor prevented from decrementing grp->bc_ackers if an unexpected or stale value (such as S) is received. A member sending acked = S followed by acked = S + 1 could decrement grp->bc_ackers twice in the same round, prematurely clearing bc_ackers or underflowing it. Fix this by: - Dropping GRP_ACK_MSG immediately if grp->bc_ackers is zero. - Requiring acked == grp->bc_snd_nxt and rejecting duplicates where m->bc_acked == acked. Because replicast broadcast rounds are strictly sequential, only grp->bc_snd_nxt can be acknowledged, and each member can acknowledge at most once per round. Note that a related pre-existing issue in tipc_group_delete_member() (where grp->bc_ackers decrementing to zero upon member departure does not restore *grp->open or trigger a socket wakeup) will be addressed in a separate patch.