CVE-2026-98366
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/rxe: validate access…
- Risk score
- 57/100
- CVSS
- 7.8 v3.1
- Exploit chance (30 days)
- 0.1%
- Published
- 6 Oct 2026
Open in the live forecast Today's forecast
What to know
- What it is
- In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/rxe: validate access flags before swapping the MR's PD rxe_rereg_user_mr() reassigns mr->ibmr.pd first and only then validates the IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS argument: if (flags & IB_MR_REREG_PD) { rxe_put(old_pd); rxe_get(pd); mr->ibmr.pd = ibpd; } if (…
- Affected
- See advisory
- Fix
- Apply the vendor's security update; see the linked advisory.
- Exploitation
- No known exploitation
Why it is Yellow
- CVSS 7.8 high
- On your watchlist: linux kernel
References
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/08f12745cb72981aa2cabe214af0c7a42a856f0a
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4dd7a53f1c5b44693c26dac4b9b5bd5bb9d604c8
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7230cc456d4bb2221c20c5f1d22b38b8576aa16f
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ae36a5b609ae79f4de966328b78d2584be9719a4
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fe602c91a52e161ace4afd5bdb8f33270c554c6f
Original description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/rxe: validate access flags before swapping the MR's PD rxe_rereg_user_mr() reassigns mr->ibmr.pd first and only then validates the IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS argument: if (flags & IB_MR_REREG_PD) { rxe_put(old_pd); rxe_get(pd); mr->ibmr.pd = ibpd; } if (flags & IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS) { if (access & ~RXE_ACCESS_SUPPORTED_MR) return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP); mr->access = access; } Both flags pass the entry check because RXE_MR_REREG_SUPPORTED is IB_MR_REREG_PD | IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS, so a caller can reach the access check with mr->ibmr.pd already reassigned. mr->ibmr.pd is owned by the core, which adjusts pd->usecnt only on the success path: ib_uverbs_rereg_mr() jumps to put_new_uobj on a driver error without undoing the reassignment, so mr->pd == new_pd while the usecnts still charge the MR to orig_pd. ib_dereg_mr_user() then decrements new_pd, whose count can reach zero while a memory window still references it; uverbs_free_pd() frees the PD on that count alone and rxe_mw_cleanup() writes to freed memory: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __rxe_put+0x31/0xa0 Write of size 4 at addr ffff8881301dd690 by task rxe_poc/591 __rxe_put+0x31/0xa0 rxe_mw_cleanup+0x42/0x200 __rxe_cleanup+0x115/0x370 rxe_dealloc_mw+0x4c/0x80 Allocated by task 591: ib_uverbs_alloc_pd+0x258/0x540 Freed by task 591: ib_dealloc_pd_user+0x174/0x210 uverbs_free_pd+0x8d/0xc0 ib_uverbs_dealloc_pd+0x18e/0x1d0 Validate the access flags before mutating any state so the callback either applies every requested change or none.
Last activity 6 Oct 2026. Patch Forecast updates every hour.