In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: sprd: validate compress…

Why it is Yellow

• CVSS 7.8 high
• On your watchlist: linux kernel

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1467e3989c6edf79d3898c78aa47027f31ee5acb
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2e27144ba4b98bb3eb14aaccd4b088e2e69844e3
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2fada8276117215407afd1f59de5d2fe22aff01f
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/38a9bb5221bcdece5507299f739c6751d8fc16b2
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7a4ce92d150b9e7ecf1a710a34d8cdeb590d3751
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8064b73997f137c00a7e2e38295a763f9423928b
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ad796a1bc1875da2ebb616ea9bc1f2994273fd02
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ff63b0adc4f6a5b61c8393d204fac44c594c4d39

Original description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: sprd: validate compress buffer sizes against fixed allocations sprd_platform_compr_open() allocates the stage 0 IRAM buffer (32K data area) and the stage 1 DDR buffer (2M data area) with fixed sizes, but sprd_platform_compr_copy() derives all copy lengths from the user controlled runtime->fragment_size and the write() count, never comparing them against the physical buffer sizes. The compress core only checks fragment_size * fragments for an u32 overflow in snd_compress_check_input(), so a local user can configure a logical buffer of up to ~4GB via SNDRV_COMPRESS_SET_PARAMS, far exceeding the fixed allocations. A fragment_size larger than the 32K IRAM data area makes the stage 0 copy_from_user() overflow past the IRAM allocation, and a buffer_size larger than the 2M DDR buffer makes the wrapping copy at the end of sprd_platform_compr_copy() write fully user controlled data past the buffer. No SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_START is needed, a write() in SETUP state reaches the copy callback directly. Reject parameters that do not fit into the fixed buffers in set_params(), and fix the advertised max fragment size: 128K never fitted into the 32K IRAM buffer. The caps values may have been carried over from the qdsp6 driver, which allocates its buffers according to the advertised maxima, unlike this driver. With 32K as max fragment size the advertised limits are self-consistent: 32K * 64 = 2M equals the DDR buffer size. Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine.