CVE-2026-92975
The Groundhogg — CRM, Newsletters, and Marketing Automation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to…
- Risk score
- 59/100
- CVSS
- 8.1 v3.1
- Exploit chance (30 days)
- 0.4%
- Published
- 10 Oct 2026
Open in the live forecast Today's forecast
What to know
- What it is
- The Groundhogg — CRM, Newsletters, and Marketing Automation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 4.8.3 via the create_support_user() function. This is due to the function identifying the support account solely by matching against publicly hardcoded constants …
- Affected
- See advisory
- Fix
- Apply the vendor's security update; see the linked advisory.
- Exploitation
- No known exploitation
Why it is Yellow
- CVSS 8.1 high
- Remotely exploitable without logging in
References
- https://github.com/groundhoggwp/groundhogg/commit/4b413aa6e
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.1/admin/help/help-page.php#L224
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.1/admin/help/help-page.php#L238
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.1/admin/help/help-page.php#L250
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.1/admin/help/help-page.php#L298
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.1/admin/help/help-page.php#L599
- https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/c355658a-515a-48ed-a114-6a202e23e34b?source=cve
Original description
The Groundhogg — CRM, Newsletters, and Marketing Automation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 4.8.3 via the `create_support_user()` function. This is due to the function identifying the support account solely by matching against publicly hardcoded constants — `user_login` `'groundhogg'` and email addresses `'support@groundhogg.io'` / `'help@groundhogg.io'` — where the `in_array()` email-equality check at line 238 is not a security boundary because any user fully controls their own email value. This makes it possible for an attacker with an account whose `user_login` is `'groundhogg'` and whose `user_email` matches one of the hardcoded support constants to have that account silently promoted to administrator — and additionally to super admin on multisite when the triggering administrator holds `manage_network_options` — resulting in full site takeover. Exploitation requires a two-actor flow: the attacker must first obtain or pre-plant an account with the hardcoded credentials (possible when open user registration is enabled or another account-creation path exists), after which a legitimate administrator must invoke the support-access feature via the `submit_ticket` or `process_send_support_access` entry points to trigger the promotion.
Last activity 10 Oct 2026. Patch Forecast updates every hour.