CVE-2026-92708 · GHSA-j22f-vq7h-c4qm
devalue: `stringify`/`uneval` serialize shared memory
- Risk score
- 66/100
- CVSS
- 7.5 v3.1
- Exploit chance (30 days)
- 0.7%
- Published
- 1 Oct 2026
Open in the live forecast Today's forecast
What to know
- What it is
- stringify and uneval serialize a typed array by emitting its backing ArrayBuffer, not just the view. In the case of a Node Buffer object, the backing buffer is a process-wide shared pool, meaning unrelated memory can be serialized into a response that is then sent to the client. For a Node Buffer the backing store is …
- Affected
- devalue (npm) >= 5.1.0, <= 5.9.2
- Fix
- Upgrade devalue to 5.9.3 or later.
- Exploitation
- No known exploitation
Why it is Amber
- CVSS 7.5 high
- Remotely exploitable without logging in
- On your watchlist: npm
Affected packages
| Package | Ecosystem | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| devalue | npm | >= 5.1.0, <= 5.9.2 | 5.9.3 |
References
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j22f-vq7h-c4qm
- https://github.com/sveltejs/devalue/security/advisories/GHSA-j22f-vq7h-c4qm
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92708
- https://github.com/sveltejs/devalue/commit/46dc877b3570dafb1cd3291b9bb48cecef8f7266
- https://github.com/sveltejs/devalue/releases/tag/v5.9.3
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j22f-vq7h-c4qm
Original description
### Impact `stringify` and `uneval` serialize a typed array by emitting its backing `ArrayBuffer`, not just the view. In the case of a Node `Buffer` object, the backing buffer is a process-wide shared pool, meaning unrelated memory can be serialized into a response that is then sent to the client. For a Node `Buffer` the backing store is Node's **process-wide shared pool**, so serializing a small `Buffer` copies up to 64 KB of unrelated process memory — including bytes from other in-flight requests — into the output. In an SSR framework (SvelteKit, Nuxt) a public page whose `load()` returns a 2-byte `Buffer`, or a small file read with `readFileSync`, ships another user's request body / `Authorization` header in its HTML. Unauthenticated, silent, ~43,000× amplification. This is serialization-side, so the `parse`/`unflatten` prototype-pollution and DoS guards do not apply — it fires on every SSR render, not only when parsing untrusted input. ### Workarounds Convert Node `Buffer` objects to `Uint8Array`: ```diff payload = { - buffer + buffer: new Uint8Array(buffer) } ```
Last activity 1 Oct 2026. Patch Forecast updates every hour.