FrankenPHP: Cross-request PHP session ID leak in worker mode when the session extension is a shared module

Why it is Amber

• CVSS 7.7 high
• Remotely exploitable without logging in
• On your watchlist: php, Go

Affected packages

References

• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-v3ph-cgqh-r8p5
• https://github.com/php/frankenphp/security/advisories/GHSA-v3ph-cgqh-r8p5
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82416
• https://github.com/php/frankenphp/pull/2523
• https://github.com/php/frankenphp/commit/be24d82531675f90862b8cde1e9fc7e9ee855aa5
• https://github.com/php/frankenphp/releases/tag/caddy/v1.12.5
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-v3ph-cgqh-r8p5

Original description

FrankenPHP is a modern application server for PHP. Prior to 1.12.5, FrankenPHP worker mode can retain PHP session state between requests when the session extension is loaded as a shared module and is unavailable through HAVE_PHP_SESSION at compile time. In this build configuration, frankenphp_reset_session_state() is compiled out, PS(id) can survive a request boundary, and a subsequent session_start() can ignore the new request's cookie because an identifier is already present. Under concurrent requests, session_id() can therefore return another client's identifier or a stale identifier from a previous request on the same worker thread, causing cross-user session exposure, possible session hijacking, and intermittent logout behavior. Builds with the session extension statically linked, including the official static binaries and Docker images, are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 1.12.5.