VeraCrypt provides disk encryption with strong security based on TrueCrypt

Why it is Yellow

• CVSS 8.8 high

References

• https://github.com/veracrypt/VeraCrypt/commit/fb9d96c52dace4d34c5427402b512e8de5f832d6
• https://github.com/veracrypt/VeraCrypt/releases/tag/VeraCrypt_1.26.30
• https://github.com/veracrypt/VeraCrypt/security/advisories/GHSA-4j3p-7hp7-xw73

Original description

VeraCrypt provides disk encryption with strong security based on TrueCrypt. Prior to 1.26.30, the Unix, macOS, and FreeBSD serialization paths in src/Platform/Serializer.cpp and src/Volume/VolumePassword.cpp accept untrusted length and count values when deserializing data that can cross from the unprivileged GUI or CLI to the root CoreService helper. Serializer::DeserializeWString allocates floor(size / sizeof(wchar_t)) elements but reads size bytes, so a non-aligned size can overflow the heap allocation. VolumePassword::Deserialize accepts PasswordSize values larger than the fixed 128-byte PasswordBuffer, allowing downstream DataPtr() and Size() consumers such as the KDF to read beyond the buffer. DeserializeString, DeserializeWString, and the string and wide-string list readers also lack allocation and collection bounds, which can exhaust memory, and a zero-length DeserializeString can access an empty vector. Windows uses a different path, and the immediate CoreService pipe writer is the same-user parent process, so the documented exposure is a local defense-in-depth boundary rather than a remote attack. This issue is fixed in 1.26.30.