Memory allocation with excessive size value in the OpenPGP signature and user attribute subpacket…

Why it is Amber

• CVSS 8.7 high
• Remotely exploitable without logging in

References

• https://github.com/bcgit/bc-csharp/commit/986fb4892bb39f292ba0fd82eba11d2cbc503217
• https://github.com/bcgit/bc-csharp/commit/f51dacf4817d9ea10d0a9841f72fac3655c65483
• https://github.com/bcgit/bc-csharp/wiki/CVE-2026-63574

Original description

Memory allocation with excessive size value in the OpenPGP signature and user attribute subpacket parsers (SignatureSubpacketsParser.ReadPacket, UserAttributeSubpacketsParser.ReadPacket) in Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. bc-csharp before 2.7.0 allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker who can supply a crafted OpenPGP public key, certificate or signature to cause a denial of service (OutOfMemoryException or memory exhaustion in the parsing process) via a subpacket header using the five-octet length form, because the declared length was used to size the subpacket buffer with no upper bound and without being compared with the size of the enclosing subpacket area or packet, so a few bytes of input could demand an allocation of up to about 2 GB before any subpacket data was read.