Memory allocation with excessive size value in the DTLS handshake reassembly…

Why it is Amber

• CVSS 8.7 high
• Remotely exploitable without logging in

References

• https://github.com/bcgit/bc-csharp/commit/212d06474166d5e85be72c2dd4898313aa5dd5f3
• https://github.com/bcgit/bc-csharp/commit/99afef612458f70f28e7824a09719bfc3a169bda
• https://github.com/bcgit/bc-csharp/wiki/CVE-2026-63566

Original description

Memory allocation with excessive size value in the DTLS handshake reassembly (DtlsReliableHandshake, DtlsReassembler) in Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. bc-csharp before 2.7.0 allows a remote unauthenticated DTLS peer to cause a denial of service through memory exhaustion via crafted handshake message fragments, because the reassembly buffer for each incoming handshake message was allocated at the 24-bit length declared in the fragment header, without the check against the peer's maximum handshake message size that TLS already applied. A fragment carrying no payload can force an allocation of almost 16 MB, for each of up to 16 pending messages per handshake, before the handshake is authenticated. DTLS servers and DTLS clients are both affected; TLS is not.