Yeti bridges the gap between CTI and DFIR practitioners by providing a Forensics Intelligence…

Why it is Yellow

• CVSS 8.3 high

References

• https://github.com/yeti-platform/yeti/commit/bfd7c2424dc05dea2d46b5b106b5071f959d5d5a
• https://github.com/yeti-platform/yeti/pull/1280
• https://github.com/yeti-platform/yeti/releases/tag/2.5.1
• https://github.com/yeti-platform/yeti/security/advisories/GHSA-4q3w-w2g5-8wqq

Original description

Yeti bridges the gap between CTI and DFIR practitioners by providing a Forensics Intelligence platform and pipeline. Prior to 2.5.1, YETI derives ExportTask.file_name from the user-controlled task name and passes it to core/clients/file_storage/classes/local_storage.py without sanitizing traversal sequences or enforcing path confinement. A low-privileged authenticated user using the default local storage backend can call POST /api/v2/tasks/export/new with a traversal name and use ExportTask.file_contents through GET /api/v2/tasks/export/{export_id}/content to read files accessible to the YETI service account. Running ExportTask.run() can also write attacker-controlled export output to an attacker-selected writable path. The impact depends on the service account's filesystem permissions, and universal code execution is not established. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.1.