Yeti bridges the gap between CTI and DFIR practitioners by providing a Forensics Intelligence…

Why it is Yellow

• CVSS 7.1 high

References

• https://github.com/yeti-platform/yeti/commit/8e36bd0000f98f625540e37eeb9f304c684e8394
• https://github.com/yeti-platform/yeti/pull/1279
• https://github.com/yeti-platform/yeti/releases/tag/2.5.1
• https://github.com/yeti-platform/yeti/security/advisories/GHSA-6xf2-8436-rgvf

Original description

Yeti bridges the gap between CTI and DFIR practitioners by providing a Forensics Intelligence platform and pipeline. Prior to 2.5.1, core/schemas/dfiq.py accepts an unvalidated uuid from DFIQ YAML through POST /api/v2/dfiq/from_yaml, and core/web/apiv2/dfiq.py later interpolates that stored value into an archive filesystem path in POST /api/v2/dfiq/to_archive. A low-privileged authenticated user can import a DFIQ object whose UUID contains traversal sequences and trigger archive export, causing attacker-controlled content with a .yaml suffix to be written outside the intended temporary archive directory. The impact is limited by paths writable by the YETI service account, and the separate DFIQ archive-import zip-slip candidate is not part of this vulnerability. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.1.