TAKO AI Agent for Okta is a local-first AI agent that helps Okta administrators query tenant data…

Why it is Yellow

• CVSS 8.8 high

References

• https://github.com/fctr-id/okta-ai-agent/commit/3b5ccaff8423cdfa6d26f5e133c01b8b71148df4
• https://github.com/fctr-id/okta-ai-agent/releases/tag/v3.0.1-beta
• https://github.com/fctr-id/okta-ai-agent/security/advisories/GHSA-r9q7-6784-7rc6

Original description

TAKO AI Agent for Okta is a local-first AI agent that helps Okta administrators query tenant data using natural language. Prior to 3.0.1-beta, any authenticated user with a valid `fctr_session` cookie can submit arbitrary Python source in the `script_code` field of `POST /api/react/execute-script`, without administrator privilege. In `src/api/routers/react_stream.py`, the source is stored with `skip_discovery=True`, bypassing AI-based content filtering, and is passed to `validate_generated_code` in `src/utils/security_config.py`. `BLOCKED_PATTERNS` recognizes direct `__import__` calls but misses the import name passed as a string, `getattr` is in `ALLOWED_BUILTINS`, and the AST checker handles `ast.Name` and `ast.Attribute` targets but fails to handle `ast.Call` targets. Dynamic `getattr` call chains through `__builtins__` therefore evade validation. The `_write_temp_script` helper writes the accepted code to disk, and `asyncio.create_subprocess_exec()` executes it as the application process user, which is root in the default container. Command output is returned as Server-Sent Events through `GET /api/react/stream-react-updates?process_id=<id>`. The resulting container compromise can disclose environment secrets including Okta API tokens and the JWT key, expose the SQLite database, and permit backend-service pivoting and persistence. This issue is fixed in version 3.0.1-beta.