Bazarr is a companion application to Sonarr and Radarr

Why it is Amber

• CVSS 10.0 critical
• Remotely exploitable without logging in

References

• https://github.com/morpheus65535/bazarr/commit/4bd29252feebd0803e84cc3ce1bdd24c3a076ed4
• https://github.com/morpheus65535/bazarr/commit/f9a8a9514944be0e7b826e67cde042cebfe9c97e
• https://github.com/morpheus65535/bazarr/security/advisories/GHSA-fvcv-hh55-x3r4
• https://github.com/morpheus65535/bazarr/tree/v1.5.7-beta.14

Original description

Bazarr is a companion application to Sonarr and Radarr. Prior to 1.5.7-beta.14, the `api_ns_plex` namespace in `bazarr/api/plex/oauth.py` omits `@authenticate` on its Resource handlers, while normal APIs require an API key and no global authentication hook compensates. Anonymous callers can invoke `POST /api/plex/oauth/logout` to clear credentials and disable the integration, or `POST /api/plex/apikey` to persist an attacker-selected key, without a PIN, account or state precondition. `POST /api/plex/oauth/pin` and `GET /api/plex/oauth/pin/<pin_id>/check` additionally allow an attacker who completes a PIN with an attacker-controlled Plex account to bind that account's token to the instance. `PlexPinCheck` skips state validation when `state_param` is absent and merely logs a mismatch without stopping execution. `POST /api/plex/select-server`, `POST /api/plex/oauth/servers`, `POST /api/plex/webhook/create`, `POST /api/plex/webhook/delete` and `POST /api/plex/encrypt-apikey` expose further `write_config()` operations. Attacker-controlled server URLs feed later outbound requests carrying the configured API key in `X-Plex-Token`, enabling server-side request forgery and credential exposure in addition to persistent configuration tampering and integration denial of service. Version 1.5.7-beta.14 closes the anonymous API-mutation path by adding authentication; complete OAuth state validation is not established and remains a separate residual for curator review.