SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations…

Why it is Amber

• CVSS 9.3 critical
• Remotely exploitable without logging in

References

• https://github.com/socfortress/CoPilot/commit/bfa630b65d554670c7462a32ce6fd4e3cbd0254c
• https://github.com/socfortress/CoPilot/pull/940
• https://github.com/socfortress/CoPilot/security/advisories/GHSA-pm2w-mmc3-h8hc
• https://github.com/socfortress/CoPilot/tree/v0.1.77

Original description

SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. In affected deployments, the unauthenticated `/scoutsuite-report` `StaticFiles` mount in `backend/copilot.py` exposes the `scoutsuite-report` directory even though normal /api routes require JWT authentication. Generated HTML reports and `scoutsuite-results/scoutsuite_results_<name>.js` files disclose AWS, Azure and GCP IAM principals, resource inventories, misconfigurations and findings. Report names derive from caller-selected names with predictable defaults. During an admin- or analyst-initiated GCP scan, `backend/app/integrations/scoutsuite/routes/scoutsuite.py` saves the uploaded Google service-account JSON key into that same web-served directory. In `backend/app/integrations/scoutsuite/services/scoutsuite.py`, `generate_gcp_report_background` removes the key only after the scan finishes. Any anonymous client that can reach the host and request the file path can therefore retrieve the private key during the scan and use the service account's cloud permissions, as well as read retained cloud-security reports. Credential isolation is released in version 0.1.77; a release fully remediating the report-disclosure component has not been established.