AVideo is a video-sharing Platform

Why it is Yellow

• CVSS 7.3 high
• Remotely exploitable without logging in

References

• https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo-Encoder/commit/ac6097cd5fa7a24df82293bff66b136d559c16db
• https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo-Encoder/releases/tag/v8.1.0
• https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo-Encoder/security/advisories/GHSA-297p-4mj8-28wm

Original description

AVideo is a video-sharing Platform. Prior to 8.1.0, the encoder lacks a global authentication layer and exposes control and status PHP endpoints to anonymous network callers. `view/run.php` has a commented-out guard and invokes `Encoder::run()`. `view/queue.json.php` calls `Encoder::getAll(true)`, reveals streamer URLs through `getSiteURL()`, and triggers processing with `execRun()`. `view/status.php` returns `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` with a wildcard, reads the queue, triggers processing, and exposes host memory statistics through `ServerMonitor::getMemory()` when `serverStatus` is set. `view/listFiles.json.php` checks only `Login::canBulkEncode()`, which admits anonymous callers whenever `disableBulkEncode` is empty, the default. Its `path` parameter is resolved with `realpath()` and listed with `scandir()` without a base-directory restriction. An unauthenticated attacker can drive the privileged queue processor, read queue and streamer-site information, obtain memory statistics and enumerate media file names and paths in any directory readable by the web-server user. Enumeration is limited to configured media extensions and does not itself disclose arbitrary file contents. This issue is fixed in version 8.1.0.