OpenHop is a tool for creating interactive data-flow diagrams

Why it is Yellow

• CVSS 8.3 high
• Remotely exploitable without logging in

References

• https://github.com/naorsabag/openhop/commit/c8190fbefa3a50e7b0c16c001d2e05b0e920cfb4
• https://github.com/naorsabag/openhop/pull/190
• https://github.com/naorsabag/openhop/releases/tag/v0.3.7
• https://github.com/naorsabag/openhop/security/advisories/GHSA-g72f-jw3w-mgh7

Original description

OpenHop is a tool for creating interactive data-flow diagrams. Prior to 0.3.7, `@openhop/server` passes unauthenticated flow route parameters from `GET /api/flows/:id` and `DELETE /api/flows/:id` in `packages/server/src/routes.ts` to `FlowStore.filePath()` in `packages/server/src/store.ts` without an identifier allow-list. The router applies `decodeURIComponent` to the id, and `path.join()` then normalizes traversal outside the configured flow directory after appending the .yaml extension. An attacker can read accessible YAML files as YAML-parsed JSON or permanently delete accessible .yaml files outside that directory, exposing configuration or secrets and disrupting dependent services. In `packages/server/src/index.ts`, CORS `origin: true` permits any browser origin, enabling a malicious webpage to target a loopback-bound instance. Docker deployments default to `HOST=0.0.0.0` and permit direct unauthenticated network access. This issue is fixed in repository release 0.3.7.