WebAssembly Micro Runtime (WAMR) is a lightweight standalone WebAssembly (Wasm) runtime

Why it is Yellow

• CVSS 8.8 high
• Remotely exploitable without logging in

References

• https://gist.github.com/shumbo/b710c35b005ed871447fce385d1ab760
• https://github.com/wasm-micro-runtime/wasm-micro-runtime/commit/b1353b5e8983047ff68829c99abf1355d5f389cf
• https://github.com/wasm-micro-runtime/wasm-micro-runtime/releases/tag/WAMR-2.4.5
• https://github.com/wasm-micro-runtime/wasm-micro-runtime/security/advisories/GHSA-jjv3-x3jf-cg49

Original description

WebAssembly Micro Runtime (WAMR) is a lightweight standalone WebAssembly (Wasm) runtime. Prior to 2.4.5, the two-pass fast interpreter loader in core/iwasm/interpreter/wasm_loader.c can make inconsistent constant-table decisions between the sizing pass and the emitting pass. After duplicate constants inflate the first pass beyond the constant-slot limit, wasm_loader_get_const_offset emits later constants inline, but the between-pass sort and deduplication reduces the table so the second pass can choose table references and cause reserve_block_ret to emit additional copy operands that were not included in code_compiled_peak_size. A crafted module can therefore make the second pass write partially attacker-controlled compiled-code data beyond the heap buffer allocated from the first pass's size calculation during wasm_runtime_load, before guest code executes. This can corrupt host heap metadata and deterministically crash the process, causing denial of service; further consequences depend on the host application's heap layout. Builds using WAMR_BUILD_FAST_INTERP=1 are affected; disabling the fast interpreter avoids the vulnerable loader. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.5.