Kubeflow Pipelines enables users to build and deploy portable, scalable machine learning workflows

Why it is Yellow

• CVSS 7.5 high
• Remotely exploitable without logging in

References

• https://github.com/kubeflow/pipelines/commit/be4723e33727c6dad71a95cba61e8f61562ab20f
• https://github.com/kubeflow/pipelines/pull/13684
• https://github.com/kubeflow/pipelines/releases/tag/2.18.0
• https://github.com/kubeflow/pipelines/security/advisories/GHSA-wg5q-x4j9-qm54

Original description

Kubeflow Pipelines enables users to build and deploy portable, scalable machine learning workflows. Prior to 2.18.0, the API server's GET /apis/v1alpha1/runs/{run_id}/nodes/{node_id}/log handler retrieved logs without authorizing the caller against the selected run. A caller who can reach the backend and knows a victim run ID and suitable pod or node identifier can read live or archived logs with the API server's permissions. For live logs, the caller-controlled node ID was also accepted as a pod name without verifying that the pod belonged to the requested run, allowing a known run ID to select the namespace of an unrelated pod and read its main container logs. The handler does not authenticate requests itself, although an external authentication gate or network policy can limit reachability. Exposed logs can contain sensitive workload data or credentials. This issue is fixed in version 2.18.0.