FreeSWITCH is a Software Defined Telecom Stack enabling the digital transformation from proprietary…

Why it is Amber

• CVSS 9.8 critical
• Remotely exploitable without logging in

References

• https://github.com/signalwire/freeswitch/commit/7015f6a73ab3d67fed5fbfc277ecfb88a74c2a86
• https://github.com/signalwire/freeswitch/pull/3135
• https://github.com/signalwire/freeswitch/releases/tag/v1.11.3
• https://github.com/signalwire/freeswitch/security/advisories/GHSA-mg63-h38w-8p9p

Original description

FreeSWITCH is a Software Defined Telecom Stack enabling the digital transformation from proprietary telecom switches to a software implementation that runs on any commodity hardware. Prior to 1.11.3, sofia_presence_handle_sip_i_message() split the To user of an inbound SIP MESSAGE on a plus sign and treated the left side as a chat protocol selector. Selecting the api chat proto reached switch_api_execute(), allowing a peer whose MESSAGE was accepted to run FreeSWITCH API commands, including operating-system command sinks, with the daemon's privileges. Inbound chat is enabled on the stock internal and external profiles, and any authenticated profile account is sufficient; stock directory users without password material can also remove that barrier in affected configurations. The flaw permits configuration and credential disclosure, arbitrary call control, and command execution, and exploitation has been observed in the wild. This issue is fixed in version 1.11.3.