obsidian-tc: Declined human-in-the-loop confirmations can permit destructive calls over HTTP

Why it is Yellow

• CVSS 7.1 high
• On your watchlist: npm

Affected packages

References

• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc
• https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/security/advisories/GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc
• https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/issues/967
• https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/pull/969
• https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/commit/101c91c656e2c2b88bcf3696a5da035f8c032c71
• https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/blob/v1.31.4/CHANGELOG.md
• https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/releases/tag/v1.31.4
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-115477
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc

Original description

obsidian-tc is a governed, agent-ready Model Context Protocol server for Obsidian vaults. From 1.13.0 until 1.31.4, on a Streamable HTTP deployment with `auth.jwtSecret` configured and a 2026-07-28-era client declaring `elicitation.form` support, a dispatch-gated tool call offered an `inputRequired` confirmation could still complete after the human declined or cancelled, or the elicitation response was omitted or malformed, provided the client echoed the validly bound `requestState` on resubmission. The server trusted an authentic, call-bound state as proof of approval even though that state was minted before the `elicitation/create` leg was asked and proved only that the resubmission belonged to the same call. A client behaving incorrectly or under an attacker's control could therefore execute dispatch-gated destructive vault operations without the human's approval, while still requiring the caller's ordinary tool permissions. Only tools marked `destructive: true` or requiring a scope with a human-in-the-loop floor were reachable through this bypass. The sixteen handler-side conditionally gated tools, including `write_note` overwrite and `move_note`, did not read elicitation state on the modern wire and let neither approval nor decline through that path. Affected deployments using stdio or leaving `auth.jwtSecret` unset instead used the CLI `elicit_token` fallback and did not offer this `requestState` round trip. The fix does not prevent a malicious client from reporting a fabricated approval, because the server cannot verify that the client displayed the form or that a human saw it. This issue is fixed in version 1.31.4.