LoopX serve-status permissive CORS policy exposes control-plane state and private Markdown files

Why it is Amber

• CVSS 7.1 high
• Public exploit or proof of concept referenced
• Remotely exploitable without logging in
• On your watchlist: PyPI

Affected packages

References

• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vx2m-gpq4-8j5q
• https://github.com/huangruiteng/loopx/security/advisories/GHSA-vx2m-gpq4-8j5q
• https://github.com/loopx-project/loopx/security/advisories/GHSA-vx2m-gpq4-8j5q
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-108372
• https://github.com/loopx-project/loopx/pull/3137
• https://github.com/loopx-project/loopx/commit/838720fba42bd22f71b5bb763ec406f7bdf4c940
• https://github.com/loopx-project/loopx/releases/tag/v0.4.5
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vx2m-gpq4-8j5q

Original description

Open and provider-neutral, LoopX is a lightweight state kernel and local-first control plane for loop engineering. From version 0.0.1 until 0.4.5, `loopx serve-status` in `loopx/status_server.py` uses `StatusRequestHandler._send_json()` and `do_OPTIONS()` to send `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` for unauthenticated responses on predictable loopback ports. A remote attacker can cause an operator who visits attacker-controlled web content to issue cross-origin requests to `GET /status.json`, `GET /review-material?goal_id=...&path=...`, `GET /`, and `POST /control-plane/configure-goal/dry-run`, exposing control-plane state, goal and run information, local absolute paths, private Markdown files below registered goal roots, and dry-run configuration projections. The affected routes do not provide cross-origin writes or arbitrary-file access. This issue is fixed in version 0.4.5.