AsyncHttpClient: Pooled connections can still be shared across NTLM, Negotiate and proxy logins

Why it is Yellow

• CVSS 7.4 high
• Remotely exploitable without logging in
• On your watchlist: Maven

Affected packages

References

• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-v2j5-22fr-j62r
• https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/security/advisories/GHSA-v2j5-22fr-j62r
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-107230
• https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/commit/d3bb4d68b41acf5d3ab7541afa9fdfe7ec3ba054
• https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/releases/tag/async-http-client-project-3.0.14
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-v2j5-22fr-j62r

Original description

The AsyncHttpClient (AHC) library allows Java applications to easily execute HTTP requests and asynchronously process HTTP responses. From 2.0.0 until 3.0.14, connection-pool partitioning still omits identity-defining fields for Kerberos, SPNEGO, NTLM, and authenticated proxy connections. Logins without a configured principal, proxy realms, identities sharing a user name, and SOCKS or CONNECT proxy logins can reuse a socket authenticated as a different identity. A later request is then executed under the first identity and can expose that identity's data or authority to another caller. In the affected execution path, SpnegoEngine, NTLM, Kerberos, SPNEGO, SOCKS, and CONNECT control or expose the vulnerable behavior. This issue is fixed in version 3.0.14.