The Advanced IP Blocker plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass in all versions…

Why it is Amber

• CVSS 9.8 critical
• Remotely exploitable without logging in

References

• https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/advanced-ip-blocker/tags/8.13.13/includes/class-advaipbl-2fa-manager.php#L71
• https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/advanced-ip-blocker/tags/8.13.13/includes/class-advaipbl-main.php#L519
• https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/advanced-ip-blocker/tags/8.13.13/includes/class-advaipbl-main.php#L6875
• https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/advanced-ip-blocker/tags/8.13.13/includes/class-advaipbl-main.php#L6912
• https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/advanced-ip-blocker/tags/8.13.13/includes/class-advaipbl-main.php#L7022
• https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3725139/advanced-ip-blocker/trunk/includes/class-advaipbl-main.php
• https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/d080845b-6814-4b10-a3ab-1f5aa1d09132?source=cve

Original description

The Advanced IP Blocker plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass in all versions up to, and including, 8.13.13 The vulnerability exists because `handle_login_action()` performs no server-side check — via transient, session marker, or equivalent — that a requester completed step-1 password authentication before processing a step-2 TOTP submission for the POSTed `user_id`; compounding this, an error branch in the function unconditionally mints a fresh `advaipbl-2fa-interim-{user_id}` nonce and delivers it in a `Location` header to any unauthenticated caller, after which `display_2fa_login_form_step_2()` renders a valid `advaipbl-2fa-verify-{user_id}` nonce in HTML — both nonces computed against a fixed `uid=0` empty-session context and therefore fully reusable by the attacker across subsequent requests. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to bypass authentication entirely for any 2FA-enabled account, including administrators, by brute-forcing an unthrottled 6-digit TOTP code (no attempt counter, no account lockout, and no `wp_login_failed` firing) and receiving a fully authenticated session cookie via `wp_set_auth_cookie` without ever supplying the account password, resulting in complete site takeover. Exploitation requires only a known `user_id` for an account that has the plugin's 2FA feature enabled.