Netty's HTTP/3 codec (io.netty:netty-codec-http3) versions 4.2.2.Final through 4.2.17.Final builds…

Why it is Yellow

• CVSS 7.5 high
• Remotely exploitable without logging in

References

• https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-hfr2-x62w-v49h
• https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/netty-4.2.2-through-4.2.15-http-1-host-header-authority-confusion

Original description

Netty's HTTP/3 codec (io.netty:netty-codec-http3) versions 4.2.2.Final through 4.2.17.Final builds the HTTP/3 :authority pseudo-header from the HTTP/1 Host header before considering the authority of an absolute-form HTTP/1 request-target. In HttpConversionUtil.toHttp3Headers(HttpMessage, boolean) — reached via Http3FrameToHttpObjectCodec(false) — a non-empty Host header takes precedence over the request-target authority, contrary to the HTTP/1.1 rule that a server receiving an absolute-form request-target must ignore the Host header. In a Netty-based HTTP/1-to-HTTP/3 gateway, proxy, or protocol bridge, a remote client can send a request such as "GET https://trusted.example/admin HTTP/1.1" with "Host: attacker.example", causing components that validate, authorize, or route on the RFC-defined request-target authority to reach a different decision than the upstream HTTP/3 peer, which receives :authority derived from the conflicting Host header. This authority confusion can affect virtual-host routing, allow-list checks, backend selection, cache keys, and URL generation. The advisory reports integrity impact only (no code execution, memory corruption, or availability impact). Fixed in 4.2.18.Final.